How China’s H-6 Badger Bomber Came Knocking At Alaska’s Door (2024)

On July 24, U.S. and Canadian militaries sent jet fighters roaring into the sky when long-range radars detected strategic bombers entering the U.S.’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on a trajectory toward Alaska.

Canadian CF-18 Hornets and U.S. F-16 and F-35A fighters intercepted the aircraft: two Russian Tu-95 “Bear” bombers and two Chinese H-6K “Badgers.”

ADIZs, which are unilaterally asserted by a state, don't have the same recognition as a country's national airspace, which generally extends just 15 miles from a coastline. As the bomber didn’t get much closer than 200 miles away from Alaska, they were not violating international law, and the intercept seemingly proceeded without drama.

Russia’s nuclear bombers have frequently brushed by the airspace of U.S., European and East Asian countries since the 2010s (resuming Cold War custom) sometimes in more provocative circ*mstances. However, the incident drew attention because it marked the first time China's missile-carrying H-6 bombers, some of which are nuclear-capable, had approached the continental U.S.

Admittedly, one constraining factor is that H-6s are “regional” bombers with significantly shorter range than Russia’s Tu-160 and Tu-95 bombers. While that deficit has been reduced by introducing more efficient turbofan engines and in-flight refueling capability, Russian footage nonetheless suggests the H-6Ks took off from an airbase in the Russian Far East to conduct the Arctic patrol.

Until now, China has instead used H-6s to visit more proximate actors the country has beef with, literally flying the bombers in circles around Taiwan, approaching (or at times violating) the airspaces of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and even buzzing U.S. warships.

But starting in 2019, H-6s also began joining Russian bombers on “Tokyo Express” patrols, so named during the Cold War because they regularly provoked Japanese fighters to scramble in response. The first in July 2019 involving H-6Ks and Tu-95s overflew contested islets, triggering a four-way aerial confrontation between fighters from South Korea and Japan. The 5-hour patrol on July 24, 2024 was the eighth joint patrol.

The joint patrols, spurred by common grievances with the United States and its allies, also give the impression that China and Russia are a double-headed hydra magnifying their perceived power. But despite both countries’ disdain for the U.S., China-Russia cooperation has remained far short of a military alliance involving commitments to come to each other’s aid in a war.

Why China has the world’s most numerous strategic bomber

If you think nuclear-powered submarines or aircraft carriers are rare military assets, then consider heavy bombers: today, only three countries—Russia, the United States and China—operate any at all.

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) likely has 210-230 H-6s in service (not including tanker and training aircraft). That outnumbers each of the U.S. and Russia’s active bomber fleets—and new aircraft continue to roll off the production lines of the Xi’an Aircraft Corporation over a half-century after production commenced.

However, the H-6s have shorter range and lower maximum payload capacity than the B-52 and Tu-95 (which also date back to the 1950s) while also lacking the stealth or supersonic speed more advanced bomber designs rely upon to survive. An H-6 can accelerate to just below the speed of sound at 640 miles per hour, but usually cruises at 488 mph.

But like B-52 and Tu-95s, H-6s remain useful because they can fly far carrying lots of big missiles that are launchable from far beyond the reach of the target’s air defenses. Those qualities also make heavy bombers useful for searching oceanic expanses for enemy warships and sinking them.

At its origins, the H-6 is a license-built variant of the Soviet Tu-16 twin-engine jet bomber, also codenamed ‘Badger’ by NATO, which Russia promptly retired 31 years ago. China's Harbin (and then Xi’an) Aircraft Companies received Tu-16 parts and schematics from the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1959. But then relations with the Soviets broke down in June 1960, forcing China to spend years reverse-engineering the Badger’s Mikulin turbojet engines.

Nonetheless, pre-assembled H-6s went on to perform nine air-dropped nuclear weapons tests at Lop Nur, including China’s first-ever air-drop test on May 14, 1965, and its first hydrogen bomb test in 1967.

Early H-6s built for gravity bombing had crews of six, with “glazed” glass noses for the bombardier and navigator to peer through, 1950s-era turbojet engines, and up to seven 23-millimeter autocannons for self-defense (three twin-guns housed in two turrets and a “tail singer,” plus an optional nose gun).

But the latest generation bombers, kicked off by the H-6K, which entered service in 2009, ditch such anachronisms and are now powered by far more fuel-efficient Russian D-30KP-2 turbofan engines and have as few as four crew.

While most modern H-6s retain bomb-bays for gravity-bombing or mine-laying, their important armament are externally-carried long-range missiles. The most notable include the beefy YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship, at least two kinds of giant hypersonic air-launched ballistic missiles, and the KD-20/CJ-20 land-attack cruise missile which also has an anti-ship variant. The H-6 crew can launch these weapons from between 300 miles and just over 2,000 miles away from their target.

The PLAAF currently has nine bomber regiments and two bomber brigades (all with 20 to 30 H-6s each) operating at least six different types of H-6 bombers as well as an additional regiment of related HD-6 aerial tankers and training brigade at the Harbin Flight Academy using old H-6A bombers.

The 106th Brigade particularly is believed to have restored the PLA Air Force’s aerial nuclear attack capability—which had seemingly been retired as nuclear gravity bombing became impractical.

Over a half-century of operations, China has lost a confirmed eight H-6s in accidents (only one in the 21^st century) resulting in the deaths of 41 crew; four occurred during takeoff, and two more in a mutual collision in 1980. Like B-52s, the Badger has mixed escape systems: crew members in the co*ckpit have ordinary upward-firing ejection seats, while personnel in the rear/lower area have downward-firing seats—less than ideal for accidents at low altitude.

How China’s H-6 bomber units are organized.

The PLAAF currently operates nine H-6 regiments and two separate brigades of H-6s. Most of the regiments, which typically number between 20 and 30 aircraft (subdivided into two to three flight groups) are assigned between three bomber divisions, all based in eastern or central China. H-6 crews receive flight training the Harbin Flight Academy and its 2^nd Training Brigade.

• 8^th Air Division based in Hunan province: two regiments equipped with H-6Ks
• 10^th Air Division based in Anhui and Jiangsu: three regiments equipped with H-6Ks, H-6Ms and H-6Hs
• 36^th Air Division based in Shaanxi province has two regiments (same mix as above)
• 106^th Bomber Brigade based in Neixiang, Henan province operating H-6Ns
• 23^rd Brigade operates H-6U tanker aircraft exclusively
• 817^th and 823^rd bomber regiments based in Jiangsu and Guanxi provinces operating H-6G and H-6J maritime strike bombers *

These last two regiments, formerly part of the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF), were reportedly transferred to the Air Force in 2023 on the premise that improved interservice cooperation made it unnecessary for the Navy to operate its own land-based bombers.

How could China use H-6 strategic bombers in a major war?

The foray into Alaska’s ADIZ illustrates how, in peacetime, strategic bomber patrols are often used to assert presence, bolster allies, and cause anxiety to (not to mention stress defenses of) possible adversaries. But how useful would H-6s prove in a high-intensity shooting war?

Arguably the most plausible flashpoint for such a terrible contingency could arise should China's leaders decide to blockade and/or invade Taiwan. H-6s would leverage their range to fly around Taiwan to interdict shipping and contribute additional missile shots approaching from less-well-defended eastern approaches. In the late stages of a campaign going in the PLA's favor, the air force might even use them for for gravity bombing.

But before that happens, should the U.S. attempt to aid Taiwan’s defense, H-6s would likely take on a more important role conducting long distance attacks targeting U.S. warships and airbases.

Maritime strikes: China’s very deep arsenal of anti-ship missiles would likely compel U.S. carrier task forces to operate hundreds of miles east of Taiwan beyond the range of most of the missiles. But the U.S. could still be well within range for the H-6 bombers’ YJ-12 or YJ-100 missiles that make up the ‘long arm’ of China’s maritime attack capabilities alongside land-based DF-21D and DF-26B anti-ship ballistic missiles.

Coordinated attacks by entire bomber regiments, theoretically able to launch somewhere between 80 and 180 heavy anti-ship missiles, might overwhelm formidable U.S. Navy air defenses. Range could also be leveraged to attack warships from unexpected angles. Such attacks could sink or cripple ships, potentially compelling carrier task forces even further eastward to the detriment of carrier air wing operations.

Minelaying: Another way to isolate Taiwan, including in a pre-hostilities blockade, might involve long-distance naval minelaying via the bomb bays on H-6Js.

Long-range land attacks: The easiest way to destroy combat aircraft is when they’re not a moving target, landed at bases in Guam, Hawaii, or Japan for refueling and rearming. The same (more debatably) may apply to ship at harbor. However, as for anti-ship attacks, China’s land-attack capabilities diminish in volume as distance increases.

However, combining the 2,500-mile range of modern H-6s with the 1,200 mile range of KD-20/CJ-10 cruise missiles results in a total range of 3,700 miles. H-6N bombers with air-refueling probes and air-launched ballistic missiles could go even further.

A successful missile campaign could destroy numerous heavy bombers and stealth fighters on the ground. Whether China could surge enough long-range attacks to sufficiently overwhelm U.S. defenses remains a mystery box. But World War II’s Doolittle Raid proved long-distance strikes don’t need to be massively effective to compel an adversary to counter-productively reallocate resources.

Combat support roles. H-6s would also contribute by enabling other platforms through provision of mid-flight refueling, performing maritime reconnaissance and targeting missions (including helping guide ground- and sea-launched missiles to target) and by jamming and geo-locating enemy radar and communications.

Nuclear strike: China’s nuclear doctrine is aligned against “first use” of nuclear weapons. But if China sought to employ nuclear weapons at a threshold below strategic nuclear exchanges of ICBMs, H-6Ns might be employed to launch nuclear attacks, perhaps targeting bases in Guam and Hawaii, or carrier task forces at sea.

As useful as the above capabilities are, the H-6 has vulnerabilities despite its ability to conduct standoff-range missile attacks: its large radar cross section means it can be detected from far away, and it lacks supersonic surge speed to evade enemy fighters and missiles.

Therefore, a forward radar picket line of (possibly unmanned) ships, airborne early warning (AEW) jets, and patrolling fighters might detect approaching H-6s and dispatch fighters to lunge forward to try to engage the bombers from afar with very-long-range air-to-air missiles, such as the recently introduced AIM-174B and forthcoming AIM-260 air-to-air missiles with ranges of 200+ and (estimated) 180 miles respectively.

To keep H-6’s alive, PLAAF/PLANAF mission planners might look for indirect approaches aimed at exploiting possible gaps in U.S. radar and fighter patrol coverage, though the geography of the so-called First Island Chain makes this difficult.

While longer-range J-11 and J-16 fighters can escort H-6s and screen against lunging U.S. interceptors, their combat radius of 900ish miles (achieved carrying external fuel tanks) means they can’t accompany H-6s fully leveraging their range. And the PLAAF has less than 10 percent the U.S. military’s aerial tanker capacity to mitigate that problem.

The PLAAF might also seek to push back U.S. airborne early warning planes with attacking fighters (particularly by J-20 stealth fighters), and/or employ electronic warfare aircraft and radar-homing missiles to create a temporary, localized air defense breach for H-6s to exploit.

The H-6’s limitations explain why China is working on an H-20 flying wing stealth bomber that could operate at reduced risk attempting to penetrate U.S. air defense zones.

A tour of the People’s Liberation Army’s many kinds of H-6 bombers in operational service

While China developed several missile-carrying H-6s in the ‘80s and ‘90s, the bomber’s modern era really begins with the H-6K first unveiled in 2007 as a prototype named “God of War” (Zhànshén), which has become a nickname for the variant generally.

The H-6K finally replaced the Badger’s cloned Soviet turbojets with more fuel-efficient D-30KP-2 turbofans imported from Russia. (Supposedly, China may eventually swap in domestic WS-18 turbofans). These and introduction of some lighter composite materials helped extend the bombers’ combat radius over 2,000 miles, or 3,500 with mid-flight refueling (a capability on at least some H-6Ks), with a max capacity of up to 12 tons of munitions and 40 tons of fuel.

Other common-sense modernizations included a new digitized co*ckpit as well as the introduction of improved electronic warfare self-defense systems, new electro-optical sensors and infrared sensors, and datalinks to allow networking with friendly forces. External missile capacity was increased from four to six, at least four of them heavy (it’s unclear whether the furthest outboard stations support heavy missiles too).

The H-6K has also been recorded carrying two mysterious new hypersonic air-launched ballistic missiles possibly named the YJ-21 or 2PZD-21.

The H-6K retains an internal bomb bay for gravity bombing used in 2019 to test drop a massive bomb estimated to weigh roughly 10 tons and measure 6 meters long, comparable to the U.S.’s 11-ton MOAB bomb.

H-6Ks have also received tech introduced in later aircraft, notably the H-6J’s jamming pods (resulting in a subvariant called the H-6KG) and apparently the H-6N’s inflight refueling capability.

H-6G/L and H-6J maritime strike bombers

The older H-6G was developed for PLA Navy in the late 1990s to provide targeting updates to ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles. However, it also can carry up to four YJ-83K missiles. A sub-model sometimes designated the H-6L can also carry more powerful YJ-12 missiles. More recently, some H-6Gs have been refitted with jamming pods for electronic warfare support.

The subsequent H-6J maritime strike bomber combines the H-6G’s capabilities with the H-6K’s many improvements. It differs from the latter by adding wing-tip electronic warfare (jamming) pods, a different electro-optical sensor and larger radar dome.

H-6H and H-6M cruise missile carriers

Like the H-6G, the H-6H represents an earlier effort to optimize the H-6 as a missile-carrying platform, while removing the internal bomb bay and outdated defensive guns. The H-6H was designed to carry two KD-63 or YJ-12 cruise missiles.

The H-6M is an evolutionary update of the H-6H, with carriage capacity increased from two to four missiles and a new terrain following system for safer low-altitude flying.

H-6N ballistic missile carrier

The 106^th Bomber Brigade's unique H-6Ns are an H-6K derivative unveiled in 2019 that’s believed to be the only manned Chinese aircraft currently assigned a nuclear attack role. Nicknamed “Thor,” the H-6N sports a prominent nose-mounted inflight refueling probe and an indented belly allowing carriage of a hulking KF-21 air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs) derived from the land-based DF-21 missiles (which includes an anti-ship DF-21D variant).

This is thought to be dual-capable (conventional or nuclear) like the DF-21, which has also been adapted into the DF-21D anti-ship missile. Analysts also believe it could optionally be outfitted to release a more exotic hypersonic glide vehicle-type weapon that’s harder for air defenses to intercept.

The indented fuselage might also allow H-6Ns to launch large WZ-8 and MD-22 supersonic drones for reconnaissance, missile targeting, and damage assessment.

HY-6 aerial refueling tanker

Introduced in the 1990s, the HY-6 was China’s first successful aerial refueling platform. Able to top up two fighters simultaneously, it can carry up to 74 tons of fuel: half internally, and the remainder split between two wing-mounted RDC-1 pods. These have been supplemented in recent years by three higher-capacity Il-78 tankers from Ukraine and eight (and counting) domestic YY-20 tankers.

While the PLA Air Force operates purpose-built HY-6U tankers manufactured without bomber avionics, the PLA Navy’s HY-6Ds were converted from old H-6D anti-ship bombers and thus some retain the glass nose, maritime search radar and maritime attack capability.